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ABSTRACT 
 
Corporate governance still becomes a major issue during the post-financial crisis period in Asian 
emerging market, such as Indonesia, Thailand, Philippines and Malaysia. Particularly, the financial 
institutions have implemented corporate governance reforms to enhance the protection of shareholders and 
stakeholders interest. The consequences emerge as it allows for greater monitoring especially by the 
shareholders. The objective of this study is to measure the corporate governance and performance in 
banking sectors in particular, which is determining by the corporate governance mechanisms. In the last 
part, this study attempts to identify whether there exist any differences in the monitoring mechanisms of 
banking firms and non-banking firms. This study found that only the foreign shareholder which is represent 
of the ownerships monitoring mechanisms are significantly negatively related with corporate performance 
measures in the banking firms in Asian emerging markets. Second, the Internal Control Monitoring 
Mechanisms showed the insignificant relationship with corporate performance, but only one of the internal 
control monitoring mechanisms which is CEO duality provides evidence in order to explain the relationship 
better. Third, the disclosure monitoring mechanisms through the big 4 external auditor is significantly 
related to corporate performance, instead of the big 3 rating agency. Last, there are similarities between 
bank and non-bank in terms of corporate governance monitoring mechanisms.  
 
Keywords:  corporate governance, firms’ performance, monitoring mechanisms. 
 
 
GENERALITIES OF THE STUDY 
 
Background of the Study 
 
Does good corporate governance still matter in 
Asian business recently? It is an interesting question 
that economist and businessess concern on it, 
although it was ten years after the Asian crisis had 
happened. Meanwhile, some people believe that 
corporate governance has no longer become main 
issues during their business. These people are 
speculators.  
Unfortunately, good governance does not matter 
equally to all classes of investor, and this make a 
difference to the way a company sees the need for 
good governance. Therefore, the question become 
more sophisticated, would corporate governance still 
relevant toward the business and economic behavior 
through such reforms such as restructuring, mergers, 
and acquisitions exercises in order to improve the 
corporate performance?  The mere fact that investors 
make a distinction based on corporate governance and 
that analysts write about its growing significance and 
are beginning to find evidence that it does make a 
difference, means that it is indeed becoming more 
important. 
Nowadays, the attention of corporate 
governance’s implementation is focused on the 
effectiveness of corporate governance in assures 
protection on investment and generates return by 
improving the corporate performance (Zulkafli and 
Samad, 2007). Nevertheless, earlier studies have 
found differences in corporate governance practices 
across industries, particularly in emerging markets.  
During the past ten years after the Asian crisis, 
many studies focused on non-financial firms in order 
to observe its corporate governance practice (Wallace 
and Zinkin, 2005). The evidence indicate that there 
are differences between corporate governance 
mechanism for financial sectors such as banking firms 
and the non-financial corporation since they operate 
under different environments. Other evidence that 
made was an issue of moral hazard in banking firm 
operational, such as transfer pricing, asset stripping, 
hiring family members, and an improper credit 
allocations that result negative impact on bank’s 
performance (Zulkafli and Samad, 2007). Therefore, 
this paper attempt to identify whether there exist any 
differences on banking firms and non-banking firms 
monitoring mechanism, based on corporate 
governance mechanism such as Ownership 
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Monitoring Mechanism, Internal Control Monitoring 
Mechanism, Regulatory Monitoring Mechanism, and 
Disclosure Monitoring Mechanism. 
 
Research Objectives 
 
The objective of this study is to measure the 
corporate governance and performance in banking 
firms/sectors in particular, which is determining by 
the corporate governance mechanisms. In the last part, 
this study attempts to identify whether there exist any 
differences in the monitoring mechanisms of banking 
firms and non-banking firms. 
 
Research Questions 
 
The research questions for this study will be: 
− Is there a significant relationship between the 
corporate performance in banking firms and the 
corporate governance monitoring mechanisms? 
− Is there a significant difference between 
monitoring mechanism on banking firms and non-
banking firms? 
 
Scope of the Research 
 
The coverage of the study is in the Asian region, 
which is represent by some countries in Asian 
emerging market. This study concerned about the 
implementation of corporate governance in Asian 
region, particularly after the economic and financial 
crisis in 1997. The data sets period using annually 
data from 2003-2007, consist of 22 banking firms in 
Indonesia, 12 banking firms in Thailand, 13 banking 
firms in Philippines, and 5 banking firms in Malaysia, 
which all those banking firms are listed on each Stock 
Exchange.  
 
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE  
AND STUDIES 
 
Definition and Features of the Independent 
Variable 
 
Issues of Corporate Governance in Banking 
 
In their book, (Brigham and Erhardt, 2005) 
defined corporate governance as the set of rules and 
procedures that ensures managers do indeed employ 
the principles of value based management. The 
essence of corporate governance is to make sure that 
the key shareholder objective -wealth management- is 
implemented.  
 
The Bassel Committee on Banking Supervision – 
Federal Reserve defined that banks are a critical 
component of any economy. They provide financing 
for commercial enterprises, basic financial services to 
a broad segment of the population and access to 
payment systems (Brigham and Erhardt, 2005). The 
importance of banks to national economies is 
underscored by the fact that banking is virtually 
universally a regulated industry and that banks have 
access to government safety nets. It is of crucial 
importance therefore that banks have strong corporate 
governance. 
 
Corporate Governance Monitoring Mechanism 
 
The Bassel Committee on Banking Supervision–
Federal Reserve papers, has highlighted the fact that 
strategies and techniques based on OECD Principles 
(Brigham and Erhardt, 2005), which are basic to 
conduct corporate governance include:  
(a)  The corporate values, codes of conduct and other 
standards of appropriate behavior and the system 
used to ensure compliance with them  
(b)  Establishment of a mechanism for the interaction 
and cooperation among the board of directors, 
senior management, and the auditors 
(c)  Strong internal control systems, including internal 
and external audit functions, risk management 
functions independent of business lines, and other 
checks and balances. 
 
In addition, the corporate governance monitoring 
mechanism becomes one of the practices of those 
particular strategies to conduct the corporate 
governance. 
 
Theories and Studies Related to the Independent 
Variable 
 
Issues of Corporate Governance in Banking 
 
According to (Caprio, et al,  2003) governance 
mechanisms would be able to reduce the 
expropriation of bank resources and promote bank 
efficiency. This is one of the facts regarding the 
importance of corporate governance of banking firms. 
In other study,  (Eldomiaty & Choi,  2003) confirmed 
that the banking institutions have in fact been 
positively contributing to companies’ performance. In 
similar, (Lowengrub, et al, 2003), supports that from 
case study of banks in Germany, the need to assume 
much larger role of corporate governance held by 
small shareholders, which is means that the good 
corporate governance can solve the agency problem 
in particular banking firms.  
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Corporate Governance Monitoring Mechanism 
 
a..  Ownership Monitoring Mechanism 
-  Large Shareholders 
 In his study, (Mitton, 2002) found that large 
shareholders can benefit the minority 
shareholders because of their power and 
incentives to prevent expropriation. 
-  Government Ownership 
 The controlling of government may used to 
solve the conflict problem between the board 
management and the shareholders (Bai, Liu, 
Lu, Song, and Zhang, 2003) 
- Foreign Ownership 
 The study of (Micco, Panizza, and Yanez, 
2004) result the interesting fact, which is the 
entry of foreign banks particularly in 
developing countries, attempt to domestic 
banks more efficient in terms of overhead cost 
and spread. It is a good impact to the banking 
sectors as well. 
b. Internal Control Monitoring Mechanism 
- CEO Duality 
 High compensation and prestige go with the 
position on the board of a major company, so 
board seats are prized possessions (Brigham 
and Erhardt, 2005). In similar, (Wallace & 
Zinkin, 2005) confirmed that the Chair needs 
the support of the CEO and must ensure that 
the committee maintains the confidence of 
management whilst also retaining its 
independence and objectivity. It is preferable 
for the Chair to not also be Chair of the Board, 
which is called CEO Duality. 
- Board Size 
 As the study of (Cheng, 2008), the variability 
of corporate performance changes with board 
size independent of the existence of agency 
problems within larger board, which is means 
that board size is an important determinant of 
volatility in corporate performance. 
- Board Independence 
 To conduct the checks and balances that is 
measure by the compliance board, needs the 
outsiders into the board to provide a more 
effective monitoring of managers (Adams and 
Mehran, 2003).  
c. Regulatory Monitoring Mechanism 
 According to (Brigham and Erhardt, 2005), the 
review from the Bassel Committee implies that 
the regulatory monitoring which is issued by the 
central bank or the government also affect the 
banking performance particularly in profitability, 
through the reserve requirement and or the capital 
adequacy ratio. 
d. Disclosure Monitoring Mechanism 
The financial transparency becomes more 
important mechanism particular in after the 
economic and monetary crisis, because it can 
define the credible assurance from banks activities 
(Zulkafli & Samad, 2007)  
- Big 4 External Auditors 
 According to OECD Principles and study of 
(Niinimaki, 2001), an auditor plays an 
important role as a bank supervisor to ensure 
the financial report controlling in order to 
improving the corporate performance. The big 
4 external auditors are Pricewater house 
Coopers, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, Ernst & 
Young, and KPMG.  
- Big 3 Rating Agency 
 In order to assess the financial health of the 
bank and the valuation of the banks, the 
shareholder needs accurate rating information 
by some trusted rating agencies (Brigham and 
Erhardt, 2005). Therefore, the rating agency 
plays an important role also on corporate 
performance. The big 3 rating agency are 
Moody’s, S&P, and Fitch. 
 
Relationship of the Independent Variable to the 
Dependent Variable 
 
As we pointed earlier, that this paper attempt to 
investigate the direct relationship between the 
corporate governance monitoring mechanism, with all 
its proxies, can affect the corporate governance 
performance with the ROA as a proxy.  
 
Definition and Features of the Dependent Variable 
 
As we discussed earlier, this paper measure the 
corporate performance of banking firms as the 
dependent variable based on the corporate governance 
principles, which is using the Return on Asset (ROA) 
ratio as a proxy. Return on Asset (ROA) is the ratio of 
income before interest and taxes (EBIT) or net 
income divided by book value of assets at the 
beginning of the fiscal year (Brigham & Ehrhadrt, 
2005). Return on assets measures a company’s 
earnings in relation to all of the resources it had at its 
disposal [the shareholders’ capital plus short and long-
term borrowed funds]. Thus, it is the most stringent 
and excessive test of return to shareholders. If a 
company has no debt, it the return on assets and return 
on equity figures will be the same. An indicator of 
how profitable a company is relative to its total 
assets. ROA gives an idea as to how 
efficient management is at using its assets to generate 
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earnings. Calculated by dividing a company's annual 
earnings by its total assets, ROA is displayed as a 
percentage. Sometimes this is referred to as "return on 
investment". (Brigham & Erhardt, 2005). The 
following is the ROA ratio calculation: 
       
AssetsTotal
IncomeNetROA=  (1)        
Boubakri et al, 2005 also used ROA, ROE, and 
Return on Sales as the variables to measure the firm 
performance. 
 
Previous Studies 
 
The main paper that supporting this paper is 
study of (Zulkafli & Samad, 2007). The topic is 
corporate governance and performance of banking 
firms. In additional paper, there are (Baubakri et al, 
2005) study which is investigate the postprivatization 
corporate governance: the role of ownership structure 
and investor protection; and the study of (Cheng, 
2008) about the board size and the variability of 
corporate performance.  
 
RESEARCH FRAMEWORKS AND 
METHODOLOGY 
 
Theoretical Framework 
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Figure 1. Control Model of Corporate Governance 
 
Conceptual Framework 
 
The idea of the theoretical framework in above 
which is similar with the conceptual framework that 
will use in this paper, defined that the model is about 
achieving and retaining control through: 
(a) Concentrated ownership and a reliance on family 
or bank finance, which determine the shareholder 
context 
(b) Board with aligned incentives, such the Board is 
dependent on the same outcome as the controlling 
shareholders 
(c) Limited disclosure and inadequate minority 
protection  
(d) Illiquid capital markets with restricted takeover 
activities and an under-developed new issue 
market. 
 
Research Hypotheses 
 
Based on the theories and the contextual 
framework, this paper will construct the hypotheses in 
order to test the relationship and how each 
independent variable is associated with dependent 
variable, in which direction on regression model. 
 
Model 1: 
 CPi.k =  α + β1 OWNi.k + β2 CEOi.k + β3 SZBi.k + β4 
INDBi.k + β5 CARi.k + β6 BIG3i.k +β7 BIG4i.k + 
β8 SIZEi.k + ei.k   (2) 
 
Model 2: 
CPi.k =  α + β1 GONi.k + β2 FORi.k + β3 CEOi.k + β4 
SZBi.k + β5 INDBi.k + β6 CARi.k +β7 BIG3i.k + 
β8 BIG4i.k + β9 SIZEi.k  + ei.k  (3) 
 
for i = 1, 2, …, N and k  = 1, 2, …, K 
where:  
i = Country 
K = Banking firms 
CP = Corporate performance measured by 
ROA 
OWN = Large block holders/shareholders 
GOV = Government ownership 
FOR = Foreign ownership 
CEO = Duality 
SZB = Number of Director in bank t 
INDB = Number of Independent Directors in 
bank t 
CAR = Capital Adequacy Ratio 
BIG3 = Rating of banks by reputable rating 
agencies (Big 3) 
BIG4 = Auditing by reputable external auditor 
(Big 4) 
SIZE = Size of banks measured by total assets 
e = Random error 
βi = Parameters to be estimated 
According to the model, then we construct the 
null hypotheses, as follows: 
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Model 1:  
Ho: β1;β2;β3;β4;β5;β6;β7;β8 = 0               (4) 
There is no significant difference between the 
large blockholders; CEO duality; the number of 
director in bank t; the number of independence 
director in bank t; the capital adequacy ratio; the 
rating of banks by the big 3 rating agency; auditing 
result by the reputable external auditor; between size 
of the bank by its total assets;  and ROA.  
 
Model 2:  
Ho: β1;β2;β3;β4;β5;β6;β7;β8;β9 = 0  (5) 
 
There is no significant difference between the 
government ownerships; foreign ownerships; CEO 
duality; the number of director in bank t; the number 
of independence director in bank t; the capital 
adequacy ratio; the rating of banks by the big 3 rating 
agency; auditing result by the reputable external 
auditor; between size of the bank by its total assets;  
and ROA.  
After we construct the null hypothesis, then the 
alternative hypotheses, as follows: 
 
Model 1:  
Ha : β1;β2;β3;β4;β5;β6;β7;β8  ≠ 0 or minimum one of the 
variable not equal with zero             (6) 
There is a significant difference between the large 
blockholders; CEO duality; the number of director in 
bank t; the number of independence director in bank t; 
the capital adequacy ratio; the rating of banks by the 
big 3 rating agency; auditing result by the reputable 
external auditor; between size of the bank by its total 
assets; and ROA  
 
Model 2:  
Ha : β1;β2;β3;β4;β5;β6;β7;β8;β9 ≠ 0 or minimum one of 
the variable not equal with zero.   (7) 
 
There is a significant difference between the 
government ownerships; foreign ownerships; CEO 
duality; the number of director in bank t; the number 
of independence director in bank t; the capital 
adequacy ratio; the rating of banks by the big 3 rating 
agency; auditing result by the reputable external 
auditor; between size of the bank by its total assets;  
and ROA.  
 
Method of Research Used 
 
In particular, this research using the Case Study 
Method in order to investigate a contemporary 
phenomenon in real life context. Moreover, this study 
concerned with how things happen and why, in such 
case of corporate governance in Asian emerging 
markets. The objective of this method is attempts to 
understand what is happening and link the contextual 
realities toward the lack of what was planned and 
what is the fact in a certain period.  
 
Collection of Data/Gathering Procedures 
 
This paper use panel data that is combination 
between time series data and cross section data, 
particularly in annually data.  The number of banking 
firms and all proxies comes from each emerging 
markets, such as Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, and 
Philippines.  The main sources of those data was 
collected from each country’s stock exchange, which 
are Indonesia Stock Exchange, SET Exchange, Kuala 
Lumpur Stock Exchange (Bursa Malaysia), and the 
Philippines Stock Exchange,  
In order to get additional data to sharpen the 
analysis, this paper also optimize the Financial 
Statement Annually and Quarterly Data/Reports for 
each banking firms, the Central Bank Annual 
Reports, The IMF Reports, and other sources of data.  
 
Statistical Treatment of Data 
 
The Research Model 
  
This study assumed a direct relationship between 
corporate governance monitoring mechanism as 
independent variables, with its proxies to measure it, 
and corporate performance of banking firms as a 
dependent variable with the ROA as its proxy.  
The research using a Panel Estimated 
Generalized Least Squares (EGLS) Regression 
Model, using the Eviews Software Package.  
 
Panel Data Analysis 
  
Panel data analysis is an increasingly popular 
form of longitudinal data analysis among social and 
behavioral science researchers. A panel is a cross-
section or group of people who are surveyed 
periodically over a given time span (Yaffe, 2006). 
In other words, it is stated that  panel data 
analysis is a method of studying a particular subject 
within multiple sites, periodically observed over a 
defined time frame. Within the social sciences, panel 
analysis has enabled researchers to undertake 
longitudinal analyses in a wide variety of fields. In 
economics, panel data analysis is used to study the 
behavior of firms and wages of people over time. In 
political science, it is used to study political behavior 
of parties and organizations over time. It is used in 
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psychology, sociology, and health research to study 
characteristics of groups of people followed over 
time. In educational research, researchers study 
classes of students or graduates over time (Yaffe, 
2006). 
Before we observed in detailed, based on 
(Cameron & Trivedi, 2005), panel model could be 
divided into two categories as well, which is linear 
panel data models and non-linear panel data models. 
The linear data models and associated estimators are 
conceptually simple, aside from the fundamental issue 
of whether or not fixed effect are necessary (will be 
describe later on).  The considerable algebra used to 
derive the properties of panel data estimators should 
not distract one from an understanding of the basics: 
The statistical properties of panel data estimators vary 
with the assumed model and its treatment of 
unobserved effects. Furthermore, much of the algebra 
does not generalize to non-linear panel models. 
According to research model in above, this paper 
would adopt the linear panel data models instead of 
non-linear panel data model.  
 
Types of Panel Analytic Models 
 
Greene, 2003 and Yaffe, 2006, defined that there 
are several types of panel data analytic models. There 
are constant coefficients models, fixed effects models, 
and random effects models.  Among these types of 
models are dynamic panel, robust, and covariance 
structure models. Solutions to problems of 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation are of interest 
here. 
a. The Constant Coefficients Model 
 One type of panel model has constant coefficients, 
referring to both intercepts and slopes. In the event 
that there is neither significant country nor 
significant temporal effects, we could pool all of 
the data and run an ordinary least squares 
regression model. Although most of the time there 
are either country or temporal effects, there are 
occasions when neither of these is statistically 
significant. This model is sometimes called the 
pooled regression model. 
b. The Fixed Effects Model (Least Squares Dummy 
Variable Model) 
 Another type of panel model would have constant 
slopes but intercepts that differ according to the 
cross-sectional (group) unit—for example, the 
country. Although there are no significant 
temporal effects, there are significant differences 
among countries in this type of model. While the 
intercept is cross-section (group) specific and in 
this case differs from country to country, it may or 
may not differ over time. These models are called 
fixed effects models. 
 The one big advantage of the fixed effects model is 
that the error terms may be correlated with the 
individual effects. If group effects are uncorrelated 
with the group means of the repressors, it would 
probably be better to employ a more parsimonious 
parameterization of the panel model. 
c. The Random Effects Model 
 Prof. William H. Greene calls the random effects 
model a regression with a random constant term 
(Greene, 2003). One way to handle the ignorance 
or error is to assume that the intercept is a random 
outcome variable. The random outcome is a 
function of a mean value plus a random error. 
Nevertheless, this cross-sectional specific error 
term vi, which indicates the deviation from the 
constant of the cross-sectional unit (in this 
example, country) must be uncorrelated with the 
errors of the variables if this is to be modeled. The 
time series cross-sectional regression model is one 
with an intercept that is a random effect. 
 According to above explanation, this paper uses 
the random effect models regarding some basic 
assumptions. There are: the unobserved effect is 
uncorrelated with all the explanatory variables; the 
unobserved individual heterogeneity as being 
distributed independently of the repressors; using a 
balanced panel data; the number of observation 
(N) greater than number of period (T); and in order 
to solve the serial correlation problem as well.  
  
Specification Tests: the Quandary of Random or 
Fixed Effect Models 
 
The Hausman specification test is the classical 
test of whether the fixed or random effects model 
should be used. The research question is whether 
there is significant correlation between the 
unobserved person-specific random effects and the 
regressors. If there is no such correlation, then the 
random effects model may be more powerful and 
parsimonious. If there is such a correlation, the 
random effects model would be inconsistently 
estimated and the fixed effects model would be the 
model of choice. 
 
Model Estimation 
 
Hausman & Taylor, 1981, have used weighted 
instrumental variables, based only on the information 
within the model, for random effects estimation to be 
used when there are enough instruments for the 
modeling. The instrumental variables, which are 
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proxy variables uncorrelated with the errors, are based 
on the group means. The use of these instrumental 
variables allows researchers to circumvent the 
inconsistency and inefficiency problems following 
from correlation of the individual variables with the 
errors. 
This paper will examine the specification of the 
model using the Hausman test, based on two models 
that we construct earlier. This test is used to decide 
whether the random effects model or fixed effects 
model that should be appropriate used in this research. 
Therefore, the result will be support the analysis and 
arguments as well. 
 
PRESENTATION AND CRITICAL 
DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
The descriptive statistics for all variables are 
presented in Table 1 to 3. It is found that 100% of 52 
banks in the sample are having at least 5% 
shareholding by a single shareholders ranging from 0 
to 99.99%. In terms of the type of large shareholders, 
foreign shareholdings can be found in 27 banks 
(51.92%) while there is and existence of 
government’s shareholdings in 12 banks (23.08%). 
The following table are in detail: 
On the other hand, the number of banking firms, 
which falls into separated leadership, is 48 banks 
(92.31%) while combined leadership has 4 banks 
(7.69%). The study also discovers that the CAR for all 
banks is above the minimum requirement (i.e. 
Indonesia and Malaysia are 8%; Thailand and 
Philippines are 10%). It is found that there are 37 
banks (71.15%) with big 3 rating agencies while 15 
(28.85%) banks are either rated by other rating 
agencies or not rated at all. There is also a significant 
presence of big 4 auditor where 42 (80.77%) banks 
are audited by big 4 external auditor while 10 
(19.23%) are audited by other categories of external 
auditors. In detailed, we can summarize as the 
following table 2. 
According to this following table, we can 
summarize all samples that are use in this paper, in 
terms of descriptive statistics analysis.  
 
Corporate Governance Monitoring Mechanisms 
and Corporate Performance 
 
We provide the result for the regression analysis 
of all corporate governance monitoring mechanisms, 
which presented in the following table below.  
 
Unit Root Test 
 
According to the theory that if our data contains 
of a time series data sets, the first step is to test 
whether our data set are stationary on particular type 
of testing. Meanwhile, regarding the number of 
observation which is the time series data set that is 
used in this study only 5 year (annually data), 
meaning that it is insufficient number to test the 
Table 1.  Descriptive Statistics on Ownership 
Large Blockholders Foreign Shareholding Government Shareholding Emerging 
Markets N At least 5% Less than 5% At least 5% Less than 5% At least 5% Less than 5% 
Indonesia 22 22 0 7 15 6 16 
Thailand 12 12 0 6 6 3 9 
Philippines 13 13 0 11 2 2 11 
Malaysia 5 5 0 3 2 1 4 
Total 52 52 0 27 25 12 40 
Percentage 100 100 0 51.92 48.08 23.08 76.92 
Source: Author (processed) 
 
Table 2.  Descriptive Statistics on the Categorical Variable 
CEO Duality Big 3 Rating Big 4 Auditor Emerging 
Markets N Separated Combined Big 3 Others Big 4 Others 
Indonesia 22 19 3 12 10 13 9 
Thailand 12 12 0 10 2 12 0 
Philippines 13 12 1 11 2 12 1 
Malaysia 5 5 0 4 1 5 0 
Total 52 48 4 37 15 42 10 
Percentage 100 92.31 7.69 71.15 28.85 80.77 19.23 
Source: Author (processed) 
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stationary (Eviews User’s Guide, 2005). Never-
theless, Eviews provide a panel unit root test, in order 
to test the stationary of the variables as a group. 
During the study, we found that as a group, the result 
is rejecting the null hypothesis, under the null 
hypothesis of no unit root, which is under the Hadri-Z 
test. In other word, the result is non-stationary. 
Therefore, we adopt the individual unit root test, using 
a Phillips-Perron Fisher Unit Root Test. This test 
defined under the null hypothesis, there is a unit root, 
while under the alternative hypothesis, and there is no 
unit root or some cross-sections without unit root.  
The following tables are the result of unit root test 
of each variable, as follow: 
 
Table 4. Board Independence 
Null Hypothesis: Unit root (individual unit root 
process)  
Sample: 2003 2007 
Exogenous variables: None 
Newey-West bandwidth selection using Bartlett 
kernel 
Total (balanced) observations: 90 
Cross-sections included: 45 (7 dropped) 
Method Statistic Prob.** 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  294.677  0.0000 
PP - Choi Z-stat NA 
Test  statistic  value  of  'NA' due to the present of a 
p-value of one or zero 
**  Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using 
an asympotic Chi-square distribution. All other 
tests assume asymptotic normality. 
Table 5. Board size 
Null Hypothesis: Unit root (individual unit root 
process)  
Sample: 2003 2007  
Exogenous variables: None  
Newey-West bandwidth selection using Bartlett 
kernel 
Total (balanced) observations: 80 
Cross-sections included: 40 (12 dropped) 
Method Statistic Prob.** 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  260.491  0.0000 
PP - Choi Z-stat -10.9780  0.0000 
**  Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an
asympotic Chi-square distribution. All other tests 
assume asymptotic normality.  
 
Table 6. Capital Adequacy Ratio 
Null Hypothesis: Unit root (individual unit root 
process)  
Sample: 2003 2007  
Exogenous variables: None  
Newey-West bandwidth selection using Bartlett 
kernel 
Total (balanced) observations: 104 
Cross-sections included: 52  
Method Statistic Prob.** 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  391.070  0.0000 
PP - Choi Z-stat -12.5373  0.0000 
** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an
asympotic Chi-square distribution. All other tests 
assume asymptotic normality. 
 
Table 3.  Descriptive Statistics on the Continuous Variable for the Full Sample 
Dependent 
Variables Independent Variables 
Corporate 
performance Board Structure 
Regulatory 
Monitoring Firm size 
  ROA Board size Board independence Capital adequacy Total Assets 
 Mean 0.98 10.88 0.41 18.24 199,255.90 
 Median 1.38 10.00 0.42 15.28 57,687.50 
 Maximum 17.70 17.00 0.58 98.02 1,592,936.00 
 Minimum -152.99 5.00 0.21 1.48 17.50 
 Std. Dev. 9.74 2.74 0.07 11.74 320,018.30 
 Skewness -15.24 0.07 -0.33 3.90 2.27 
 Kurtosis 241.66 2.47 2.69 22.75 7.73 
            
 Jarque-Bera 627,104.10 3.25 5.74 4,882.19 465.10 
 Probability 0.00 0.20 0.06 0.00 0.00 
            
 Sum 254.19 2,828.00 107.28 4,742.49 51,806,546.00 
 Sum Sq. Dev. 24,591.14 1,942.06 1.41 35,710.92 26.5E+13 
            
 Observations 260 260 260 260 260 
Source: Author (processed) 
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Table 7. Total Assets 
Null Hypothesis: Unit root (individual unit root 
process)  
Sample: 2003 2007  
Exogenous variables: None  
Newey-West bandwidth selection using Bartlett 
kernel 
Total (balanced) observations: 104 
Cross-sections included: 52  
Method Statistic Prob.** 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  339.083  0.0000 
PP - Choi Z-stat -11.0887  0.0000 
**  Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using 
an asympotic Chi-square distribution. All other 
tests  assume asymptotic normality. 
 
Table 8. Return on Assets (ROA) 
Null Hypothesis: Unit root (individual unit root 
process)  
Sample: 2003 2007  
Exogenous variables: None  
Newey-West bandwidth selection using Bartlett 
kernel 
Total (balanced) observations: 104 
Cross-sections included: 52  
Method Statistic Prob.** 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  356.071  0.0000 
PP - Choi Z-stat -11.3408  0.0000 
** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an
 asympotic Chi-square distribution. All other tests 
assume asymptotic normality 
 
The Model Estimation using Regression Analysis 
 
First, we run the regression for model 1, as we 
stated earlier, which is define the relationship between 
corporate governance monitoring mechanisms 
(independent variables), without the government and 
foreign ownership variables, and corporate 
performance (dependent variable). We construct 
model 1 in order to measure whether the corporate 
governance monitoring mechanisms, particular 
without the government or foreign intervention, are 
significantly affect the corporate performance in term 
on accounting-based measure (represent by ROA). 
We can observe in detail by the following table 9.   
On table 9, we can analyze that only three 
variables are significantly influence ROA. There are 
CEO duality, with │t stat│> 2.33, which is 3.806569, 
significant at 99% confidence level; Capital 
Adequacy Ratio, with │t stat│> 1.64, which is 
1.695967, significant at 90% confidence level; and 
Big 4 External Auditor, with │t stat│> 1.64, which is 
1.948367, significant at 90% confidence level. In 
other word, the result is rejecting the null hypothesis, 
which is no significant difference between those three 
variables and ROA on each confidence level.  
Based on R-squared and adjusted R-squared 
result which are 0.095886 and 0.067070, we can 
analyze that the independent variables have little 
effect on the ROA estimation. Nevertheless, 
regarding the theory that it is normally of having a 
small R-squared and adjusted R-squared, when the 
data sets is contains of cross section data, therefore we 
can still emphasize on it as well as the other indicators 
on the regression result.  
Second, we run the regression for model 2, as we 
stated earlier, which is define the relationship between 
corporate governance monitoring mechanisms 
(independent variables), without the large block 
holders ownership variables, and corporate 
performance (dependent variable). We construct 
model 2 in order to measure whether the corporate 
governance monitoring mechanisms, particular 
without the large block holders intervention, are 
significantly affect the corporate performance in term 
on accounting-based measure (represent by ROA). 
We can observe in detail by the following table 10   
On table 10, we can analyze that only three 
variables are significantly influence ROA. There are 
foreign shareholder, with │t stat│> 1.96, which is 
2.230526, significant at 95% confidence level; the 
CEO duality, with │t stat│> 2.33, which is 3.509504, 
significant at 99% confidence level; and Big 4 
External Auditor, with │t stat│> 1.64, which is 
1.795646, significant at 90% confidence level.  In 
other word, the result is rejecting the null hypothesis, 
which is no significant difference between those three 
variables and ROA on each confidence level.  
Similar with the earlier explanation, we also 
measure the R-squared and adjusted R-squared as 
well. We can point out that on model 2, the R-squared 
is 0.100058 which is highly than model 1, 
respectively. As well as the R-squared result, the 
adjusted R-squared on model 2, which is 0.067660, 
slightly higher than model 1. We can summarize 
briefly that model 2 is better than model 1, in terms of 
the ability of foreign shareholders, CEO duality, and 
the external auditor in affecting the ROA. 
 
Misspecification Test of the Model 
 
In order to examine whether the models that this 
paper used are appropriate and have no 
misspecification, then we start to run the 
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misspecification test using Hausman test. According 
to the panel data analysis, which is used in this study, 
therefore we can examine whether the random effect 
model is appropriate instead of fixed effect models, to 
be able to support the analysis process precisely.  
First, we run the Hausman test for model 1. The 
following table 11 is given in detail. Based on the 
result given on table 11, we can analyze that under the 
null hypothesis that is no misspecification on the 
model against the alternative hypothesis, which is, 
there is misspecification, the result is no evidence to 
reject null hypothesis. In other word, with the 
probability (p-value) is greater than 0.05, which is 
1.0000, on 95% confidence level, and remained at 
99% or 90% confidence level as well, therefore we 
can conclude that model 1 is appropriate under the 
random effect models approach, instead of fixed 
effect models. 
According to the result given on table 12, we can 
analyze that under the null hypothesis that is no 
misspecification on the model against the alternative 
hypothesis, which is, there is misspecification, the 
result is no evidence, as well as the model 1 result, to 
reject null hypothesis.  In other word, with the 
probability (p-value) is greater than 0.05, which is 
0.3004, on 95% confidence level, and remained at 
99% or 90% confidence level as well, therefore we 
strongly suggest that model 2 is appropriate under the 
random effect models approach, instead of fixed 
effect models, as well as model 1. 
  
Ownership Monitoring Mechanism 
 
From the result given on table 9, we can observe 
that the large block holders, which is represent of the 
ownership, does not provide a statistically significant 
Table 9.  Regression Result without Government/Foreign Ownerships (Model 1) 
Dependent Variable: ROA   
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section random effects) 
Sample: 2003 2007   
Periods included: 5   
Cross-sections included: 52   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 260  
Swamy and Arora estimator of component variances 
Period SUR (PCSE) standard errors & covariance (no d.f. correction) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C 0.926047 5.240536 0.176708 0.8599
LARGE_BLOCKHOLDER -4.385959 2.900130 -1.512332 0.1317
CEO_DUALITY -10.26235 2.695958 -3.806569 0.0002
BOARD_SIZE 0.166235 0.243935 0.681472 0.4962
BOARD_INDEPENDENCE -2.441570 7.725995 -0.316020 0.7522
CAPITAL_ADEQUACY 0.097991 0.057779 1.695967 0.0911
BIG_3_RATING_AGENCY -0.550930 1.706638 -0.322816 0.7471
BIG_4_EXTERNAL_AUDITOR 3.493397 1.792987 1.948367 0.0525
TOTAL_ASSETS -1.04E-06 1.74E-06 -0.596049 0.5517
 Effects Specification   
   S.D.   Rho  
Cross-section random 0.000000 0.0000
Idiosyncratic random 9.582038 1.0000
 Weighted Statistics   
R-squared 0.095886    Mean dependent var 0.977654
Adjusted R-squared 0.067070    S.D. dependent var 9.744049
S.E. of regression 9.411612    Sum squared resid 22233.19
F-statistic 3.327487    Durbin-Watson stat 2.752250
Prob(F-statistic) 0.001229    
 Unweighted Statistics   
R-squared 0.095886    Mean dependent var 0.977654
Sum squared resid 22233.19    Durbin-Watson stat 2.752250
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in measuring the corporate performance through 
ROA. Meanwhile, when foreign shareholders and 
government shareholders are included as proxies for 
ownership, particular in model 2, we found that only 
foreign shareholders ownership is significant in 
negative relationship with ROA. However, we can 
emphasize on whether these results are persistent with 
changes of time, the composition of the shareholders, 
in order to have a comprehensive analysis as well.  
a. Internal Control Monitoring Mechanism 
 We found that both board size and board 
independence in model 1 and model 2, are 
statistically insignificant on ROA as a proxy of 
corporate performance. Meanwhile, the CEO 
duality is significant in negative relationship in 
explaining the ROA, on both model 1 and model 
2. 
b. Regulatory Monitoring Mechanism: Capital 
Adequacy Ratio 
 The regression results showed that there is a 
statistically positive significant relationship 
between Capital Adequacy Ratio and ROA, with 
controlling for firm size, which is present by the 
total assets variable. However, it is confirmed by 
model 1 only.   
c. Disclosure-Monitoring Mechanism 
 The interesting result as well as showed by the 
insignificant relationship between the big 3 rating 
agency and ROA, both on model 1 and model 2. 
Nevertheless, the big 4 external auditor found to 
have statistically significant in positive 
relationship with ROA.  However, the result are 
confirmed only at 90 % significant level. 
 
Table 10. Regression Result without Shareholders Ownership (Model 2)
 
Dependent Variable: ROA   
Method: Panel EGLS (Cross-section random effects) 
Sample: 2003 2007   
Periods included: 5   
Cross-sections included: 52   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 260  
Swamy and Arora estimator of component variances 
Period SUR (PCSE) standard errors & covariance (no d.f. correction) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
C -1.090709 4.845545 -0.225095 0.8221 
GOVERNMENT_SHAREHOLDING -0.985776 1.517374 -0.649659 0.5165 
FOREIGN_SHAREHOLDER -2.704946 1.212694 -2.230526 0.0266 
CEO_DUALITY -9.168540 2.612489 -3.509504 0.0005 
BOARD_SIZE 0.270588 0.247525 1.093175 0.2754 
BOARD_INDEPENDENCE -5.785454 7.646007 -0.756663 0.4500 
CAPITAL_ADEQUACY 0.082842 0.057553 1.439415 0.1513 
BIG_3_RATING_AGENCY -0.524005 1.812933 -0.289037 0.7728 
BIG_4_EXTERNAL_AUDITOR 3.406720 1.897211 1.795646 0.0738 
TOTAL_ASSETS -1.61E-06 1.68E-06 -0.960199 0.3379 
 Effects Specification   
   S.D.   Rho   
Cross-section random 0.000000 0.0000 
Idiosyncratic random 9.590139 1.0000 
 Weighted Statistics   
R-squared 0.100058    Mean dependent var 0.977654 
Adjusted R-squared 0.067660    S.D. dependent var 9.744049 
S.E. of regression 9.408636    Sum squared resid 22130.61 
F-statistic 3.088395    Durbin-Watson stat 2.764446 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.001556    
 Unweighted Statistics   
R-squared 0.100058    Mean dependent var 0.977654 
Sum squared resid 22130.61    Durbin-Watson stat 2.764446 
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Table 11. The Result of Hausman Test for Model 1 
 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test  
Equation: EQ01   
Test cross-section random effects  
Test Summary Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob. 
Cross-section random 0.000000 8 1.0000
* Cross-section test variance is invalid. Hausman statistic set to zero. 
** Warning: robust standard errors may not be consistent with 
        assumptions of Hausman test variance calculation. 
** Warning: estimated cross-section random effects variance is zero. 
Cross-section random effects test comparisons: 
Variable Fixed  Random Var(Diff.)  Prob. 
LARGE_BLOCKHOLDER -2.814594 -4.385959 0.738190 0.0674
CEO_DUALITY -16.670862 -10.262350 18.777138 0.1392
BOARD_SIZE 0.397723 0.166235 0.620206 0.7688
BOARD_INDEPENDENCE 10.701148 -2.441570 312.140657 0.4569
CAPITAL_ADEQUACY 0.070300 0.097991 0.011311 0.7946
BIG_3_RATING_AGENCY -0.784304 -0.550930 27.728897 0.9647
BIG_4_EXTERNAL_AUDITOR 4.854372 3.493397 120.488497 0.9013
TOTAL_ASSETS -0.000002 -0.000001 0.000000 0.9460
Cross-section random effects test equation:  
Dependent Variable: ROA   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Sample: 2003 2007   
Periods included: 5   
Cross-sections included: 52   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 260  
Period SUR (PCSE) standard errors & covariance (no d.f. correction) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -8.373511 13.20822 -0.633962 0.5268
LARGE_BLOCKHOLDER -2.814594 3.024722 -0.930530 0.3532
CEO_DUALITY -16.67086 5.103462 -3.266579 0.0013
BOARD_SIZE 0.397723 0.824446 0.482412 0.6300
BOARD_INDEPENDENCE 10.70115 19.28294 0.554954 0.5795
CAPITAL_ADEQUACY 0.070300 0.121035 0.580820 0.5620
BIG_3_RATING_AGENCY -0.784304 5.535477 -0.141687 0.8875
BIG_4_EXTERNAL_AUDITOR 4.854372 11.12220 0.436458 0.6630
TOTAL_ASSETS -1.53E-06 7.47E-06 -0.204933 0.8378
 Effects Specification   
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
R-squared 0.253264    Mean dependent var 0.977654
Adjusted R-squared 0.032977    S.D. dependent var 9.744049
S.E. of regression 9.582038    Akaike info criterion 7.556832
Sum squared resid 18363.09    Schwarz criterion 8.378528
Log likelihood -922.3881    F-statistic 1.149699
Durbin-Watson stat 3.340161    Prob(F-statistic) 0.238643
 
JURNAL MANAJEMEN DAN KEWIRAUSAHAAN, VOL.11, NO. 1, MARET  2009: 94-108 
 
106 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 12. The Result of Hausman Test for Model 2 
 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test  
Equation: EQ02   
Test cross-section random effects  
Test Summary Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob. 
Cross-section random 10.650237 9 0.3004
** Warning: robust standard errors may not be consistent with 
        assumptions of Hausman test variance calculation. 
** Warning: estimated cross-section random effects variance is zero. 
Cross-section random effects test comparisons: 
Variable Fixed  Random Var(Diff.)  Prob. 
GOVERNMENT_SHAREHOLDING 2.872733 -0.985776 11.672844 0.2587
FOREIGN_SHAREHOLDER -2.165381 -2.704946 5.256393 0.8139
CEO_DUALITY -17.419984 -9.168540 19.264015 0.0601
BOARD_SIZE 0.623373 0.270588 0.665064 0.6653
BOARD_INDEPENDENCE 8.511862 -5.785454 307.657869 0.4150
CAPITAL_ADEQUACY 0.066645 0.082842 0.011473 0.8798
BIG_3_RATING_AGENCY -1.615048 -0.524005 28.520746 0.8381
BIG_4_EXTERNAL_AUDITOR 2.773461 3.406720 113.547720 0.9526
TOTAL_ASSETS 0.000003 -0.000002 0.000000 0.5809
Cross-section random effects test equation:  
Dependent Variable: ROA   
Method: Panel Least Squares   
Sample: 2003 2007   
Periods included: 5   
Cross-sections included: 52   
Total panel (balanced) observations: 260  
Period SUR (PCSE) standard errors & covariance (no d.f. correction) 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.  
C -10.59251 13.48757 -0.785353 0.4332
GOVERNMENT_SHAREHOLDING 2.872733 3.738351 0.768449 0.4431
FOREIGN_SHAREHOLDER -2.165381 2.593650 -0.834878 0.4048
CEO_DUALITY -17.41998 5.107750 -3.410500 0.0008
BOARD_SIZE 0.623373 0.852251 0.731442 0.4654
BOARD_INDEPENDENCE 8.511862 19.13424 0.444850 0.6569
CAPITAL_ADEQUACY 0.066645 0.121597 0.548081 0.5843
BIG_3_RATING_AGENCY -1.615048 5.639811 -0.286366 0.7749
BIG_4_EXTERNAL_AUDITOR 2.773461 10.82345 0.256246 0.7980
TOTAL_ASSETS 2.69E-06 7.96E-06 0.337595 0.7360
 Effects Specification   
Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
R-squared 0.255741    Mean dependent var 0.977654
Adjusted R-squared 0.031341    S.D. dependent var 9.744049
S.E. of regression 9.590139    Akaike info criterion 7.561202
Sum squared resid 18302.18    Schwarz criterion 8.396593
Log likelihood -921.9562    F-statistic 1.139665
Durbin-Watson stat 3.354393    Prob(F-statistic) 0.251177
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Corporate Governance Monitoring Mechanism of 
Banks and Non-Banks 
 
In the last part of this chapter, this study also 
provide the interesting finding that we are able to 
identify many similarities as well as differences 
between the relationship of corporate governance 
mechanisms and corporate performance, in terms of 
banking firms and non-banking firms. In the 
following table, we summarize the comparative result 
between bank and non-banks in detail: 
 
Table 13.  Comparative Results between Banks 
and Non-banks 
Relationship Variables Bank Non-bank 
Large blockholders  Negative  Negative 
Foreign Shareholding  Inconclusive Positive 
Government shareholding  Negative Negative 
Board size  Positive  Negative 
Board independence  Negative Positive 
CEO duality  Negative Negative 
Capital adequacy  Positive Not applicable
Big 3 rating agency  Negative Not applicable
Big 4 external auditor  Positive Positive 
Total assets  No relationship Positive 
Source: Author 
 
Even though some of the independent variables 
that statistically insignificant in explaining the 
dependent variable, but we still have a sufficient 
arguments to describe the relationship between each 
independent variable and the dependent variable, 
through the sign of the coefficient of each 
independent variable.   
However, we realize that there is a limitation and 
less accurate to use only the sign of each coefficient of 
independent variable, in order to generalize the 
relationship with dependent variable. Therefore, in 
further study we strongly suggest to have a better 
model and analysis methodology as well as to get 
more information that is valuable in this particular 
knowledge.  
 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Summary of Findings 
 
According to the discussion in earlier, we can 
summarize the finding of this study given as follow: 
a. The large block holders, which is represent of the 
ownership, does not provide a statistically 
significant in measuring the corporate 
performance through ROA.  
b. The foreign shareholders ownership is statistically 
significant in negative relationship with ROA.  
c. The board size and board independence in model 
1 and model 2, are statistically insignificant on 
ROA as a proxy of corporate performance.  
d. The CEO duality is significant in negative 
relationship in explaining the ROA, on both 
model 1 and model 2.  
e. There is a statistically significant in positive 
relationship between Capital Adequacy Ratio and 
ROA,  
f. There is an insignificant relationship between the 
big 3 rating agency and ROA, both on model 1 
and model 2.  
g. The big 4 external auditor found to have 
statistically significant in positive relationship with 
ROA. 
 
Conclusions 
 
According to the objectives of this paper, which 
is to identify whether there exist any differences in the 
monitoring mechanisms of banking firms and non-
banking firms and our findings are emphasizing on a 
perspective of corporate governance monitoring 
mechanisms in the banking sectors, particular in 
emerging markets. In summary, this study found that 
only the foreign shareholder which is represent of the 
ownerships monitoring mechanisms are significantly 
negatively related with corporate performance 
measures in the banking firms in Asian emerging 
markets. 
Meanwhile, the paper found that the Internal 
Control Monitoring Mechanisms showed the 
insignificant relationship with corporate performance, 
but only one of the internal control monitoring 
mechanisms which is CEO duality provides evidence 
in order to explain the relationship better. 
The study also confirmed that the disclosure 
monitoring mechanisms through the big 4 external 
auditor is significantly related to corporate 
performance, instead of the big 3 rating agency. The 
result is a slightly difference with the expectation. 
However, we can extent the data and add more the 
information, including a better model construction, in 
further study. 
Lastly, the paper found the similarities between 
bank and non-bank in terms of corporate governance 
monitoring mechanisms. The basic arguments is that 
a good corporate governance monitoring mechanisms 
are still matters in order to achieve the shareholders 
objectives as well as the stakeholders and the firms 
goals. However, it is important to highlight that the 
findings are generated during the early stage of the 
adoption of good corporate governance in Asia 
region, which is from 2003-2007.  
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Recommendations 
 
We strongly suggest in a particular study in 
further research, that use a larger data set, including 
the cross-sections and time series data, in order to get 
more accurate and reliable in data analysis. Regarding 
the annually data that is used in this paper, we suggest 
to having a longer period, in order to be able to assess 
the effectiveness and the implication of the policies 
related to the corporate governance monitoring 
mechanisms as well as the corporate performance.  
The last important things that should provide in 
the further research is that using more than one 
dependent variable in order to represent or as a proxy 
of corporate performance, instead of using ROA only. 
Therefore, we can expect more comprehensive and 
valuable knowledge from that particular study.  
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